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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20020594-SC

vs.
ANGIE BRAKE,
Defendant/Petitioner,

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). The decision of the Court of Appeals is
found as follows: State v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 51 P.3d 31, cert, granted, 59
P.3d 602.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that the search of Brake's

vehicle was justified for reasons of officer safety? On certiorari, this Court reviews the
decisions of the Court of Appeals for correctness and affords no deference to its
conclusions. State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at 1 8, 13 P.3d 576.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
l

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Angie Brake appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming her

conviction in Fourth District Court for attempted possession of a controlled substance,
a class A misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Angie Brake was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on

February 9, 2000, with possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 4).
On July 5, 2000, Brake filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds that the
search of her vehicle constituted an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 29-40). On August 7, 2000, a
suppression hearing was held before Judge Davis (R. 41-42). On October 10, 2000,
Judge Lynn W. Davis denied Brake's Motion to Suppress in a signed memorandum
decision (R. 50-64).
On December 4, 2000, Brake entered a plea of "guilty" to attempted possession
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, conditioned upon her right to appeal
the denial of her motion to suppress (R. 73-74, 78).
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On January 29, 2001, Brake was sentenced to thirty-days in the Utah County
Jail, ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $850.00, and placed on supervised
probation for a period of twenty-four months (R. 86-88, 104).
Brake appealed her conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals (Case No.
20010204-CA). The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction on May 31, 2002. State
v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 51 P.3d 31.
Brake petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the
petition on October 23, 2002. State v. Brake, 59 P.3d 602.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On January 29,2000, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Neil Castleberry, a sergeant
with the Utah County Sheriffs Office, was patrolling in the area of West Geneva Road
when he observed two vehicles—a green Nissan car and a white Chevy truck—in a small
puUout between the road and the lake (R. 102 at 14-15). Castleberry pulled in behind the
vehicles ccto determine whether or not they needed assistance" (R. 102 at 15, 30).
Castleberry testified that the engine to the truck was running, but that he did not know if
the green Nissan's engine was on (R. 102 at 30). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at %2. In
addition, nothing in the record suggests that the vehicles were either illegally parked or
in need of assistance. 2002 UT App 190 at f28 (Orme, j . dissenting).
Castleberry first approached the driver's side window of the green car and spoke
with an individual in the driver's seat after the driver had rolled the window down (R.
102 at 15-16, 30). The individual in the driver's seat was a young female (R. 102 at 31).
Castleberry asked the vehicle's occupants what they were doing and was informed that
3

they were sitting and talking (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry then asked the female in the
driver's seat for identification and learned that she was fifteen years old and that she had
not been driving the vehicle (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry was informed that the owner of
the vehicle was sitting in the back seat (R. 102 at 16). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at f3.
Castleberry then tried to look in the vehicle but the windows were fogged (R. 102
at 16). Although Castleberry indicated that it was "difficult" for him to see, he testified
that he could see "two individuals in the back seat" (R. 102 at 16).
-Castleberry then went to the driver's side rear, but could not see through the
window and so he "opened the door to be able to speak with the passenger" (R. 102 at
16, 32). When Castleberry opened the car door, he encountered the appellant, Angie
Brake (R. 102 at 16). Castleberry inquired of Brake as to whether she was the owner of
the vehicle and why a fifteen-year old was sitting in the driver's seat (R. 102 at 17,33).
Brake informed Castleberry that she was the owner of the vehicle, that the occupants
were from San Pete County, and that she had driven the vehicle to its present location
and that the fifteen-year old sat in the driver's seat after their arrival (R. 102 at 17, 33).
Castleberry asked Brake for identification (R. 102 at 33). Brake replied that her
identification was in her purse and she pointed to the front seat and she offered to reach
forward and retrieve it (R. 102 at 17, 34-35). Castleberry did not want Brake to retrieve
it for officer safety reasons so he went around the rear of the vehicle and opened the front
door on the passenger side "to retriever her purse so that [he] could hand it to her, make
sure that there weren't any weapons" (R. 102 at 17-18, 35-36). Brake, 2002 UT App
190 at f5.
Once Castleberry opened the front door, he reached in and retrieved a purse (R.
102 at 18). As he reached for the purse, he "noticed a small white bindle containing
4

white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the purse on the front seat" toward the
console of the vehicle (R. 102 at 18, 19). Castlebeny admitted that he had to get into the
vehicle to get the purse (R. 102 at 36).

Id.

Castlebeny questioned the occupants as to ownership of the cocaine but received
no response (R. 102 at 37). Castlebeny then asked the occupants to whom the purse
belonged and was informed that it belonged to Lilly, who was sitting in the white truck
(R. 102 at 38). Castlebeny then picked up the purse and the cocaine and walked over to
the truck (R. 102 at 43). Castlebeny testified that he approached the truck because he
did not know its occupants and was concerned for his safety (R. 102 at 44). Brake, 2002
UTAppl90atTf6.
When he got to the truck, Castlebeny opened the door and asked the occupant if
she was "Lilly" (R. 102 at 43). He then had Lilly exit the truck and asked her if the
cocaine belonged to her (R. 102 at 45). Castlebeny also field tested the bindle and it
tested postively for cocaine (R. 102 at 19, 42, 43).
Ultimately Castlebeny found Brake's purse somewhere in the front area of the
vehicle (R. 102 at 38).
Castlebeny subsequently interviewed Brake, without administering the Miranda
warnings, in order to find out to whom the cocaine belonged (R. 102 at 20). Brake
informed Castlebeny that she did not know who owned the cocaine (R. 102 at 20).
Castlebeny questioned Brake further; and when he was asked by Brake what was going
to happen, he told her that because she owned the vehicle, she was the responsible party
and would be arrested for possession of cocaine unless someone claimed ownership of it
(R. 102 at 20-21). Castlebeny testified that Brake then admitted to ownership of the
cocaine (R. 102 at 21). Castlebeny also testified that Brake claimed ownership of some
5

drug paraphernalia that was found in the back window of the vehicle (R. 102 at 21).
Brake later informed Castleberry that the cocaine belonged to the driver of the white
truck, Juan Carlos Juarez and that everyone in both vehicles had used from that same
container (R. 102 at 25,28).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Brake asserts that Sergeant Castleberry5 s opening of the front passenger door to her
vehicle constituted a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution that was not minimal nor was it justified either by probable cause or as a
search for weapons. Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court overturn the legal conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the warrantless search was justified on grounds of "officer
safety"; and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions
that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
SEARCH OF BRAKE'S VEHICLE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Brake appealed from a conviction of attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor. Prior to the entry of her conditional plea, Brake filed a
motion to suppress in the trial court alleging that the search of her vehicle constituted an
illegal search and seizure requiring suppression of all evidence discovered as a result of
6

the search. The trial court denied the motion because he concluded that the search of
Brake's vehicle-the opening of the jfront passenger door and the subsequent entry into the
vehicle to retrieve a purse-was justified for reasons of "officer safety'5 (R. 127 at 27-28).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on grounds of officer safety. Brake,
2002 UT App 190 at 1ff24-27. Judge Orme filed a dissenting opinion. Brake, 2002 UT
App 190 at ffif28-31. Brake asserts that the Court of Appeals' decision is erroneous and
is in conflict with prior decisions from this Court. Accordingly, Brake requests that this
Court overturn the legal conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the warrantless search
was justified on grounds of "officer safety"; and that this matter be remanded to the
Fourth District Court with instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence
suppressed, and the matter dismissed.
The presumptive rule under Fourth Amendment case law "relating to reasonable
searches and seizures is that searches may not be conducted without a warrant supported
by probable cause." State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at f9, 13 P3d 576. While an individual
has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in a vehicle." State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d
1132,1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has
resulted in an "automobile exception" to the warrant rule which allows officers the ability
to "temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity for the purposes of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion." James,
2000 UT 80 at ^[10. The detention must be "temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." James, 2000 UT 80 at n.2.
In addition, "owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the
intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the
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course of the investigation." James, 2000 UT 80 atf 10. However, "if no arrest is made,
an officer may make a warrantless search of the automobile only if there is probable cause
for the search" or "if the officer has a reasonable and 'articulable suspicion that the
suspect is potentially dangerous5" and "'may gain immediate control of weapons.5"
Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135,1137 (citing United States v. Ross, 434 U.S. 798, 825, 102
S.Ct. 2157,2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) and quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049,1052-55 n. 16,103 S.Ct 3469, 3481, 3482-83 n.16, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)).
Moreover, the opening of a vehicle to search for physical evidence door constitutes a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. James, 2000 UT 80 at f 13; Schlosser, 11A P.2d
at 1135-36. See also, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67,
89L.Ed.2d81(1986).
In reaching its decision to affirm the conviction on grounds that a proper search
and seizure was performed, the Court of Appeals first concluded that a governmental
interest exists in removing unlicensed drivers from the road and that Castlebeny "having
discovered an underage and unlicensed individual at the wheel of a running vehicle" was
justified in requesting identification from Brake who owned the vehicle. Brake, 2002 UT
App 190 at f23. However, the Court of Appeals' decision erroneously ascertained that
the vehicle was running. This indication is clearly erroneous and not supported by
Castleberry's testimony. Castlebeny testified that the engine to the truck was running, but
that he did not know if the green Nissan's engine was on (R, 102 at 30).
The Court of Appeals concluded that the search of Brake's vehicle was justified
under an officer safety exception and also because the intrusion was deemed to be
minimal. The Court of Appeals cited the following facts to support its conclusion: Both
vehicles were running in a desolate and frequent crime area. An under-aged driver was
8

sitting in the driver's seat of the green Nissan. Five individuals were present in the two
vehicles. The windows were fogged and Castleberry was unable to identify the
passengers in the rear seat of the Nissan. The purse at issue was in a dark area outside
Castleberry's control. Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at f*5.
As established above, the Court of Appeals' finding that the Nissan's engine was
running is clearly erroneous and not supported by Castleberry's testimony. In addition,
the majority opinion omits several important facts also present in this case. One, although
there were five individuals present in the two vehicles, Castleberry did not call for backup until after the search of the vehicle (R. 61). If Castleberry was truly concerned for his
safety, he would have called for back-up and would have taken other precautionary
actions. Two, there is nothing in the record which suggests that the vehicles were either
illegally parked or in need of assistance. Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at f28 (Orme, j .
dissenting). Three, Castleberry expressly testified that he elected to open the vehicle's
front door and retrieve the purse so that he could "make sure that there weren't any
weapons" (R. 102 at 17-18,35-36). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at 1J28.
In reaching its conclusion that the intrusion was minimal and the search was
justified under an officer safety exception, the Court of Appeals relied on New York v.
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct 960 (1986). In Class, the officer was allowed to open a
vehicle door in order to obtain the VIN number from the vehicle, after the defendants had
voluntarily exited the vehicle. Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at 1H21-22. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that after applying a balancing test between the "governmental interest in
highway safety served by obtaining the VIN," and the "concern for the officers' safety,"
the particular method of obtaining the VIN was justified. Class, 475 U.S. 106 at 118, 106
S.Ct at 968.
9

The basis for which the U.S. Supreme Court found that the police officers were
justified in opening the door of the car and moving the papers in order to retrieve the VIN
of the vehicle, was because 'the VIN plays an important part in the pervasive regulation
by the government of the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such regulation
will on occasion require the State to determine the VIN of his or her vehicle, and the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished. This is
especially true in the case of a driver who has committed a traffic violation." 106 S.Ct. at
965.
Furthermore the Court concluded, "it is unreasonable to have an expectation of
privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from
the exterior of the automobile. The VIN's mandated visibility makes it more similar to the
exterior of the car than to the trunk or glove compartment The exterior of a car, of course,
is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a "search."" Id. at
966. The Supreme Court also stated that even though the interior of an vehicle is not
subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist within one's home, a car's interior as
a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable
intrusions by the police. Id.
The facts in Class are very distinguishable from those of the present case. In the
present case, the officer was not searching for a VIN of the automobile and had not pulled
the automobile over for any violations of the law. The vehicle was parked legally and the
officer had no reason to retrieve the VIN of the vehicle.
By basing their majority opinion on the outcome of Class, the Court of Appeals
ignores both the distinguishing facts of this case and prior Utah case law concerning the
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search of the interior of a vehicle for weapons in the course of an investigatory stop.
Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at 1HI28-31 (Orme, j . dissenting).
For example prior Utah cases establish that an officer may only conduct a weapons
search if he "reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may obtain immediate control
of weapons." State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992). For such a search
to be justified, however, "a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances [must
believe] that his safety... was in danger." State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986).
Brake maintains that Castleberry's warrantless search of the passenger
compartment was not a minimal intrusion and that it was not supported by "reasonable
and articulable suspicion" that Brake or the other occupants of the vehicle were dangerous
or that there were weapons present State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38
(Utah 1989). "An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief
that the suspect is dangerous and 'may gain immediate control of weapons.'" Schlosser,
774 P.2d at 1137 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049,103 S.Ct at 3481). However, "'due
weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience.'" Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1137 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1,27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals main opinion completely ignores this Court's
prior decision in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996). In Chapman, this Court
held that "a weapons search was not warranted, even though the suspect was a gang
member who had reputedly carried a weapon in the past, where 'nothing about the nature
of the underlying offense being investigated'—i.e., parking on school property after hours-'prompted a concern for safety... [and] [n]othing defendant, did, by way of conduct,
ll

attitude, or gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon in the vehicle."5 Brake, 2002 UT
App 190 at T|30 (Orme, J. dissenting) (quoting Chapman, 921 P.2d at 454).
In Chapman, the officer, upon discovering the illegally parked vehicle, pulled
behind the vehicle and turned his warning lights on the defendant's vehicle. Chapman,
921 P.2d at 448. The officer did not see any weapons, he only had knowledge that the
defendant had the reputation of carrying a weapon and that he was a known gang
member. Nothing about being illegally parked in a school parking lot, by its very nature,
suggested the presence of weapons and therefore this Court concluded that the officer was
not justified in searching for weapons to ensure his own safety.
In this case, similarly, Brake asserts that the officer was not justified in making any
search for weapons for his safety, because "nothing about a motorist possibly needing
assistance, or even underage driving, by its very nature suggests the presence of
weapons." Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at f31 (Orme, J. dissenting). Castleberry, the
officer, testified that he originally stopped and approached Brake's vehicle to determine
whether or not they needed assistance (R. 102 at 15, 30). Upon approaching the parked
vehicle, Castleberry found that an underage driver was sitting in the driver's seat of the
vehicle (R. 102 at 16, 31). Accordingly, Brake asserts that the officer was not justified to
search even part of the interior of the vehicle for weapons while conducting his
investigation of underage driving and that all evidence found as a result of the search
should have been suppressed. Id. The officer did not see any weapons, did not observe in
furtive movements or other conduct consistent with the presence of a weapon, and the
officer had no reason to believe that weapons were present. Id.
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Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court overturn the legal conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment on
grounds that it was a minimal intrusion supported by reasons of "officer safety".

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Brake asks that this Court reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with
instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter
dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17™ day of March, 2003.
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Margaret Lindsay
Counsel for Petitioner
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I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 17th day of
March, 2003.
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STATE v. BRAKE

Utah 31

Cite as 51 P3d 31 (UtahApp. 2002)
1

consideration so as to constitute a sale or
exchange. Because no sale or exchange occurred, Sieg owes no commission under the
Agreement. Since Sieg has prevailed below
and on appeal, he was correctly awarded
Jt^[i2] 1119 First, while Sieg omitted the attorney fees and is entitled to fees incurred
jgga] basis for seeking attorney fees from his on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
-"affidavit, this does not warrant reversal by court's decision on both issues and remand to
itself because the parties and the judge knew the trial court to determine the amount of
the legal basis for seeking attorney fees. In reasonable attorney fees Sieg is entitled to as
Bad v. NACM Interrnouniavrw Inc., 1999 UTa result of this appeal.
97,988 P.2d 942, the supreme court held that
1T 23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H.
because both the court and counsel were
aware of the legal basis for seeking* attorney JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM
fees, there was no prejudice from a failure to A. THORNE JR., Judge.
state a legal basis in the affidavit. See id. at
H 21. In this case, the trial court and counsel
( o I KEY NUMBER$YSTIM>
knew that the Agreement provided the legal
basis for attorney fees. Therefore, Sieg's
omission does not warrant reversal.
fit is adequate because the trial court was
^sufficiently familiar with the case to make
fthe determination without a precise affidavit
fjfaeh requirement is discussed in order be-

v *•

*

», 120 Second, the affidavit states the number of hours the attorney spent in prosecut2002 UTApp 190
ing the matter. Sieg details the number of
STATE of Utah, Appellee,
hours his attorney and an associate worked
on the case as well as the rate at which each
v.
billed. Therefore, Sieg's counsel complied
Angie BRAKE, Appellant
with the second requirement of rule 4-505(1).
[13] 1121 Finally, Premier argues that
No. 20010204-CA
Sieg failed to explain the nature of the serCourt of Appeals of Utah.
vices his attorney rendered. 'Under Utah
law, the party daiming attorney fees^ is reMay 31, 2002.'
quired to provide the trial court with sufficient evidence to allow a determination of
reasonableness. See Cabrera v. CottreU, 694
After denial of her motion to suppress
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). Although the
evidence Sieg produced at trial is not ideal, it evidence of cocaine found in vehicle, defenis sufficient because the parties and the trial dant pled guilty in the Fourth District Court,
court knew that the dispositive issue in this Provo Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., to
case was whether there was adequate consid- attempted possession of a controlled suberation to support a sale or exchange. The stance. Defendant appealed. The Court of
record shows that the trial court was very Appeals, Thorne, J., held that: (1) police offifamiliar with this issue and the quality of the cers request for defendant's driver's license
work Sieg's counsel provided. Therefore, was justified and reasonable; (2) officer's conunder the facts of this case and the discretion cern for safety justified officer's warrantless
accorded to the trial court, the evidence pre- entry into vehicle to retrieve purse; and (3)
sented was sufficient to affirm the award of officer's retrieval of purse from vehicle, -to
extent action constituted a search, was miniattorney fees.
mally intrusive in furtherance of legitimate
public safety concerns.
CONCLUSION
Affirmed.
V 22 In sum, the transfer of the Property
from Sieg to MJTM was not supported by
Orme, J., dissented and filed an opinion.

32 Utah

51 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

1. Criminal Law ^1139,1158(4)
In reviewing a motion to suppress, a
trial court's factual findings are reviewed
deferentially under the clearly erroneous
standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion
given to the application of the legal standards
to the underlying factual findings.'
2. Arrest <s=>63.5(9)
Police officer's request for driver's license of vehicle owner who was sitting in
back seat of the running vehicle parked on
side of road was justified and reasonable,
where officer had originally asked girl in
driver's seat for a valid driver's license, but
girl informed officer she was too young to
have a driver's license and that the vehicle
owner was sitting in the back seat. U.S.CJL
ConstAmend. 4; U.CA.1953,41-6-165, 41-81(1).
3. Searches and Seizures <s=>65
Police officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to retrieve occupant's purse from front
passenger seat, upon being told by occupant,
who was in back seat, that her identification
was in purse, was justified in light of officer's
concerns for his safety, and thus constitutionally permissible; officer was unable to see
into backseat due to the darkness and fogged
windows, there were a total of five individuals in two vehicles that appeared to be running, officer was in a desolate and high crime
area, and purse was located in dark area out
of his control. U.S.CA- ConstAmend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures <s=»65
To the extent that police officer's action
constituted a search, officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to retrieve occupant's purse
from front passenger seat, upon being told
by occupant, who was in back seat, that her
identification was in purse, was focused and
mkumally intrusive in furthering legitimate
public safety concern, and thus constitutionally permissible, where officer did not root
through the interior of the vehicle, did not
reach into any compartments, and did not
open any containers.
U.S.CA. Const.
Amend. 4.
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Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and
THOKNR
OPINION
THORNE, Judge.
H1 Appellant Angie Brake (Brake) appeals
from a conviction for Attempted Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5837-S(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1999). We affirm
BACKGROUND
112 On January 29, 2000, at approximately
11:45 p.m., Utah County Deputy Sheriff Neil
Castleberry (Castleberry) observed two vehicles stopped in a small puDout on the side
of the road west of the Geneva Steel plant.
Castleberry pulled up behind the vehicles to
mquire whether the occupants of either vehicle needed assistance. Because he was
merely mquiring whether anyone needed assistance, pastleberry did not have his emergency lights on when he approached the~ vehicles. Castleberry, however, was aware
that the vehicles were stopped in an^area
"known for frequent criminal activity.?
KS Upon exiting his vehicle, Castleberry
approached one of the two vehicles, a green
Nissan* which he believed had the engine
running. ^Castleberry observed a young
woman in the driver's seat. He asked the
woman to roll down the window, which she
did, and then he asked for her driver license.
The woman told Castleberry that she was
fifteen years-old and that she did not have a
driver license. The woman also told Castleberry that she had not been driving the
vehicle. Castleberry then inquired about the
vehicle's owner, and the woman told him that
the vehicle's owner was sitting in the back- ~
seat
114 Because the vehicle's windows were
fogged, Castleberry was unable to see clearly
into the backseat. He was able, however, to
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claimed ownership because she owned the
vehicle. Brake then admitted that the cocaine belonged to her and that she and the
others had used the cocaine throughout the
evening. Castleberry arrested Brake and
called for backup. A subsequent search of
the Nissan uncovered drug paraphernalia.
118 Brake was bound over on charges of
possessing a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Brake
subsequently filed a motion to suppress both
the cocaine and her incriminating statements.2 The trial court denied Brake's Motion as it pertained to the admissibility of the
cocaine and granted her Motion pertaining to
her mainiinatmg statements.
H 9 In denying that portion of Brake's Motion to Suppress, the trial court concluded
that opening the vehicle's front passenger
door to retrieve the purse was justifiable
under the officer .safety exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
The trial court relied upon the following facts
in reaching its decision:
1. [Castleberry] was alone on patrol and
had not yet called for backup.
2. It was late at night; it was dark~and
none of the occupants ]r»»^ ™ TT+QVI
County.
3. The road is located in a remote areaof
Utah County and . . . Castleberry described it as a "deserted road."
4. There were two vehicles at the site
with occupants in each (three occupants in the subject vehicle and two
occupants in the pickup truck which
was parked contiguous).
5. This was an area of frequent criminal
activity.
6. [Castieberry's] vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and
the fact that all of the windows were
fogged up.
H 7 Castleberry proceeded back to the Nis7. The other vehicle was running and . . .
san and asked the three individuals who
Castleberry testified he believed that
owned the cocaine. Castleberry received no
the subject vehicle had the engine on
response from them. Unable to determine
with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl
who owned the cocaine, Castleberry told
behind the wheel and two other pasBrake that she would be arrested if no one
sengers in the back seat.
see that two persons, a male and a female,
were sitting in the backseat. Because his
vision was obscured, Castleberry opened the
backseat door to speak to the two persons.
Brake, who was sitting in the backseat, identified herself as both the vehicle's owner and
the driver. Brake told Castleberry that she
and the others, including the individuals in
the other vehicle, were from Sanpete County.
She also told Castleberry that she had
changed seats with thefifteen-year-oldwhen
they arrived at their current location.
If 5 Castleberry asked Brake for her identification. Brake told Castleberry that her
identification was in her purse and pointed to
the front passenger seat, where no one was
sitting. Because the purse was located 'In a
dark area over which he h[ad] no control[J* *
Castleberry decided, for safety reasons, to
retrieve the purse himself. Castleberry
walked around to the passenger side of the
front seat and opened the vehicle door to
retrieve the purse. As Castleberry reached
inside the vehicle to remove the purse, he
saw, in plain view, «a white bindle next to the
purse near the vehicle's console.
f 6 Castleberry picked up the purse and
asked for its owner. Someone sitting in the
Nissan told Castleberry that the purse belonged to "Lilly," and that she was sitting in
the other vehicle. Castleberry took the purse
and the bindle over to the other vehicle. He
opened the vehicle's door and asked for Lilly.
Castleberry also asked the persons sitting in
the vehicle if the purse belonged to Lilly.
One of the two persons identified herself as
Lilly and told Castleberry that she owned
the purse. Lilly, however, denied owning the
bindle. Castleberry had Lilly exit the vehicle and continued to question her at his
patrol car. He also tested the white powdery substance contained in the bindle, which
tested positive for cocaine.

J. This quote comes from the trial court's Ruling
on Motion to Suppress, 110.

2. Castleberry had questioned Brake before administering her Miranda warning.
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defendant's behavior, the trooper concluded
that the defendant "was trying to hide something." Id. The trooper approached the passenger side of the vehicle, tapped on the
window, and opened the door. See id The
trooper "scanned the interior of the truck for
contraband and saw a bag of marijuana in
the passenger door pocket." Id The trooper
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
also "smelled marijuana smoke." Id The
[1] Ull Brake argues the trial court
trooper arrested both the defendant and the
erred by denying that portion of her Motion
driver.
to Suppress alleging that by opening the
f 15 The defendant moved to suppress the
passenger door to obtain the purse, Castle3
berry's actions constituted an impermissible marijuana. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion
and suppressed "all the eviwarrantless search. In reviewing a motion
to suppress, "[a] trial court's factual findings dence seized." Id The trial court concluded
are reviewed deferentially under the clearly that the trooper "acted on *a mere suspicion
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of that the defendant . . was engaged in crimilaw are reviewed for correctness with some nal activity,' and had no legal basis for the
discretion given to the application of the legal search and seizure." Id (citation omitted).
standards to the underlying factual findings." The State appealed.
State v. Loya, 2001 TJT App 3, U 6, 18 P.3d
1F16 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
1116.
trial court's ruling. See id at 1139. The
court concluded that the trooper's opening
ANALYSIS
the vehicle door was a'"search." Id. at 1135.
[2-4] 112 Brake argues that Castleberry The court also concluded that the search was
conducted an' impermissible warrantless unlawful See id at 1135-36. The court
search when he opened the Nissan's front reasoned that
[the trooper's] testimony established that
passenger door to retrieve the purse, and
his opening the car door exceeded the
therefore, violated her Fourth Amendment
legitimate objectives of a traffic stop. The
right against unreasonable searches and sei[trooper's] "clear initial objective" in openzures. To support her argument, "Brake reing the car door was to see whether [the
lies upon State v. Scklosser, 774 iP2d 1132
defendant] was '^hiding something." How(Utah 1989).
ever, without probable cause to justify it,
H13 In SMosser, a Utah Highway Patrol
that
act clearly exceeded the lawful scope
trooper stopped a vehicle for a traffic violaof
a
legitimate
government interest.
tion. See id at 1133. As the vehicle pulled
Id
to the side of the road, the trooper observed
the defendant, a passenger in the vehicle,
117 Finally/ the court explained "that the
"bending forward, acting fidgety, turning to trooper "cited no safety concerns as the basis
the left and to the right, and turning back to for his actions; he sought only to investigate
look at the [trooper]." Id The movement the possibility that defendants were engaged
drew the trooper's attention.
in illegal activity." Id 'at 1137. Because of
the
safety concerns in the present case, we
H14 After the vehicle stopped, the driver
conclude
that Scklosser is inapplicable to the
exited the vehicle, approached the trooper,
and presented the trooper his license and present matter.
registration. See id at 1133-34. All the
H18 The facts and the reasoning set forth
while, the trooper noticed that the defendant in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,106 S.Ct.
"continued to move about the cab of the 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), are applicable to
truck" Id at 1134. As a result of the the present matter. In Class, the United
110 As a result of the trial court's decision, Brake pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance. She conditioned her plea on the right to appeal the
trial court's partial denial of her Motion to
Suppress. This appeal followed.

3. The defendant also moved to suppress drug
paraphernalia and two firearms, which the

trooper discovered while searching the vehicle
See id

STATE v. BRAKE

Utah

35

Cite as 51 P3d 31 (UtahApp. 2002)

this search was sufficiently unintrusive to
States Supreme Court held that a minimally
be constitutionally permissible in. light of
intrusive warrantless search was justified in
the lack of reasonable expectation of privalight of the Fourth Amendment protection
cy in the VIN and the fact that the officers
against unreasonable searches when balobserved respondent commit two traffic
anced against concerns for police officer safeviolations. Any other conclusion would exty. See id at 117-18, 106 S.Ct at 967-68.
U 19 In Class, police officers stopped the pose police officers to potentially grave
risks without significantly reducing the indefendant for two traffic violations. See id
trusiveness of the ultimate conduct—viewat 107-08, 106 S.Ct. at 962. Upon stopping
ing the VIN—which, as we have said, the
his vehicle, the defendant exited and apofficers were entitled to do as part of an
proached one of the two officers conducting
undoubtedly justified traffic stop.
the stop. See td. at 108, 106 SJOt at 963.
While one of the officers spoke with the Id at 119,106 S.Ct. at 968.
defendant, the other officer proceeded to the
123 The Utah Supreme Court has held
defendant's vehicle and opened the door in
that
a governmental interest exists in "rean effort to locate the VIN number. See id.
moving
unlicensed drivers from the road for
The officer was unable to locate the VIN
number on the doorjamb, and, subsequently, public safety reasons." State v. Harmon*
he reached into the vehicle's interior to re- 910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (addressing
move some papers that obscured the area of the public safety concerns of individuals drivthe dashboard where the VIN number was ing with a suspended license). Moreover,
also located. See id* Upon doing so, the Utah Code Ann. § 41-8-1(1) (1998) prohibits
officer saw a gun protruding from under- a person under sixteen years old from operneath the driver's seat. See id. The officers ating a motor vehicle. And, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-165 (1998) makes it a crime for a
arrested the defendant. See id.
vehicle's owner to allow 'an' underage and
- H 20 The defendant filed a motion, to sup- unlicensed person to operate that Vehicle.4
press the gun, which the trial court denied. Having-discovered an underage and unliSee id Ultimately, the New York Court of censed individual at the wheel of a running
Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
vehicle, we conclude that it was both justifithat the officer's intrusion into the vehicle
able and reasonable for Castleberry to rewas a search that was not justified because
quest from Brake, the vehicle's owner, her
the facts of the case " 'reveal no reason for
driver license "in light of the governmental
the officer to suspect other criminal activity
interest in removing unlicensed drivers from
[besides the traffic infractions] or to protect
the road for public safety reasons." Harhis own safety.' " Id at 109,106 S.Ct. at 963
mon, 910 FM at 1203.
(quoting State v. Class, 63 NX2d 491, 483
N.Y.S.2d 181, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (1984)).
1[24 Our conclusion that Castleberry was
1T21 The United States Supreme Court both justified and reasonable in his request
reversed. The Court determined that "the to Brake, also leads this court to conclude
governmental interest in highway safety that the United States Supreme Court's reaserved by obtaining the VIN is of the first soning in Class, concerning "police officer
order, and the particular method of obtaining safety, is applicable in this matter. Specifithe VIN here was justified by a concern for cally, in the situation facing Castleberry, he
the officers' safety." Id at 118, 106 S.Ct at was justified in his decision to retrieve the
968. The Court reasoned that "[tfhe search purse.
was focused in its objective and no more
1f 25 Castleberry approached two vehicles,
intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objec- both of which he believed to be running, in a
tive." Id
desolate and frequent crime area. After he
had encountered the Nissan's occupants,
H 22 As a result, the Court held that
4. Utah Code Ann § 41-6-165 (1998), states "It
is unlawful for the owner
of any vehicle
knowingly to permit the operation of such vehi-

cle upon a highway in any manner contrary to
law." Id

36 Utah

51 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

Castleberry discovered that (1) the individual
in the Nissan's driver's seat was fifteen
years-old and did not possess a driver license; (2) due to the darkness and fogged up
windows, he was unable to see clearly into
the Nissan's backseat to identify the passengers sitting in the backseat; (3) the individuals in both vehicles totaled five; and (4) the
purse was located in a dark area out of his
control.
1126 When Castleberry set out to retrieve
the purse, "[t]he search was focused in its
objective and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective." Class, 475 U.S.
at 118,106 S.Ct at 968. As in Class", Castleberry did not "root about the interior of
[Brake's vehicle]." Id, Further, "[Castleberry] did not reach into any compartments"" or
open any containers." Id. Ultimately, Castleberry's "safety [and a legitimate public
safety concern] wfere] served by the [minimal] governmental ^truston/' Id. at 117,
106 S.Ct at 968. The trial court's decision to
deny Brake's Motion to Suppress, as it r ^
lates to Castleberry's retrieval of the purse,
is therefore affirmed.5

or emergency flashers were activated. Second, the officer expressly testified that he
elected to open the one vehicle's front doot
and retrieve the purse so that he could
''make sure that there -weren't any weapons." *

5. Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, Castleberry neither requested nor conducted a weapons
search of either the vehicle or the purse Castleberry merely retrieved the purse from a dark
area within the vehicle that was outside of hxs
immediate control and sought to convey the
purse to its owner Castleberry did not search
the purse, and therefore, as we stated above, to
the extent that Castleberry's action constituted a
search it was focused in its objective and no
more intrusive than necessary See Hew York v
Class, 475 U S at 118, 106 SCt at 968 Ultimately, Castleberry's action helped to ensure not
only his safety, but also the safety of those in the
vehicle

there weren't any weapons"—was not disclosed
to the occupants of the vehicle Contrary to the
claim m that footnote, however, the officer candidly admitted this was his purpose m entering
the vehicle and retrieving the purse himself—this
is not something I have created from whole
cloth. The officer satisfied himself that there
were no weapons in the area where he located
the purse It is true he did not search the purse,
but at that point in tame he had seen the bindle
and the focus of the encounter had therefore
dramatically changed. Moreover, the record
does not disclose the size, shape, or weight of the
purse It is entirely possible the officer did not
search the purse only because its size, shape, and
weight were inconsistent with the possibility it
contained a firearm

f 29 Utah law concerning the search of the
interior of a vehicle for weapons, in the
course of an investigatory stop, is clear. As
explained in a series of cases, none of which
are cited in the main opinion, an officer may
conduct a weapons search only if he "reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may
obtain immediate control of weapons.* State
v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah CtApp.
1992). This regimen also applies to traffic
stops, even though they are regarded as
potentially dangerous. See id. at 869. Such
a search is justified only if " 'a reasonably
prudent [person] in the circumstances would
be warranted m the behef that his safety .
was in danger/ " State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d
291, 293 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry v Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). And such a belief can
originate in the officer's contemporaneous
1271 CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, observations—either of a weapon or of some
furtive movements consistent with retrieval
Judge.
of a weapon—or in the inherent nature of the
underlying
offense.' See State v. Chapman,
ORME, Judge (dissenting).
921 P.2d 446,454 (Utah 1996).
1128 Two facts, omitted from the main
opinion, bear mention. First, the officer os1130 Thus, in Bradford, a weapons search
tensibly set about ta see if the occupants of was permitted not because of a generalized
the lawfully parked vehicles needed assis- safety concern or because the mtrusion was
tance even though nothing in the record sug- deemed slight, but because the officer nogests a trunk or hood was open, jacks and a ticed the driver pull a black bag toward the
spare tare were positioned by either vehicle, front of the car from an area where the

1. As pointed out in footnote 5 of the mam opinion, the officer's purpose—to "make sure tha.t
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officer earlier observed a rifle. See 839 T2d
at 871. And in State v. Strickiing, 844 P2d STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
979 (Utah CtApp.1992), a weapons search
v.
was upheld where a vehicle's occupants were
suspected of involvement in a burglary. See
Michael BUNTING, Defendant
%d. at 984 (noting " TQt is reasonable for an
and Appellant.
officer to believe that a burglar may be
No. 20010016-CA.
armed with weapons' ") (quoting State v.
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)). "ConCourt of Appeals of Utah.
versely, m reversing this court in Chapman,
the Utah Supreme Court held a weapons
June 6, 2002.
search was not warranted, even though the
suspect was a gang member who had reputedly carried a weapon in the past, where
Defendant pled guilty in the Third DisM
*[n]othing about the nature of the underly- trict Court, Salt Lake Department, Timothy
,
ing offense being investigated "—i.e., park- R. Hanson, J., to child abuse homicide. Deing on school property after hours— fendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bill" 'prompted a concern for safety . . . ings, Associate P.J., held that: (1) misrepre[and][n]othing defendant did, by way of con- sentations by detectives during interview
duct, attitude, or gesture, suggested the with defendant were not suf&cient to overpresence of a weapon in the vehicle/ " State come defendant's will; (2) statements by dev. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996) tective during interview with defendant did
(quoting State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 not constitute threats or suggestions of le(Utah CtApp.1992) (Orme, J., dissenting)). niency which had overcome defendant's free
If 31 Applying the correct legal doctrine to to have induced defendant into making inthis case, rather than the jurisprudence criminating statements; (3) detectives, in conwhich has developed concerning law enforce^ ducting interview with defendant, did not
ment's entitlement to ascertain a vehicle employ "false Mend technique" to induce
identification number, leads to the opposite defendant to make mcriminating statements;
result from that reached by the majority. and (4) tactics by detectives during interview
The officer did not see any weapons, nor with defendant did not exploit any known
does the record suggest he observed any mental or psychological condition of defenfurtive movements or other conduct consis- dant to induce mcriminating statements.
tent with the retrieval or presence of a weapAffirmed.
on. And nothing about a motorist possibly
needing assistance, or even underage driving,
by its very nature suggests the presence of 1. Criminal Law <S==>1158(4)
weapons. It follows that the officer was not
In reviewing the denial of defendant's
entitled to search even part of the interior of motion to suppress, an appellate court recites
the vehicle for weapons while conducting his the facts in a light most favorable to the trial
investigation of possible underage driving, court's findings.
and that all evidence found as a result of that
2. Criminal Law e=>1134(3)
search should have been suppressed.
The ultimate determination of voluntariness of mcriminating statements is a legal
question that an appellate court reviews for
correctness. UJS.CA- ConstAmends. 5, 14.
I O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

3. Criminal Law <s=»1158(l)
An appellate court sets aside a trial
court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous.

FILED /o-/£>-ac>
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMA B.SMITH, Clerk
&

—Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
CASE NO. 001400514

vs.

DATE: OCTOBER 10, 2000

ANGIEM BRAKE

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS
Defendant.

CLERK: SGJ

Defendant, Angie M. Brake, filed her Motion to Suppress on July 5, 2000. A
suppression hearing was conducted on August 7, 2000. Defendant was present and was
represented by Mr. Paul Dewitt, Esq. Mr. David Clark, Deputy Utah County Attorney,
represented the State of Utah.
The matter was taken under advisement and the State of Utah was given time to file a
memorandum. The Statefiledits Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress on August 15, 2000.
The Court, having considered the testimony at the hearing, arguments of counsel, and
legal memoranda, now finds and rules as follows:
1.

On January 29, 2000, Deputy Castleberry of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was

on patrol alone in an isolated area of Utah County on a road which goes along Utah Lake by the
Lindon Boat Harbor and which is directly west of the Geneva Steel Plant.
2.

Officer Castleberry testified that this is an area that "has been known to frequent

criminal activity." Transcript at page 33.
3.

It was a dark, cold winter night at approximately 11:45 p.m. when Officer

Castleberry spotted two vehicles off the road. Officer Castlebeny stopped to investigate and "to
determine whether or not they needed assistance. .." Transcript at page 15. One vehicle was a
white pickup truck and the other was a Nissan passenger vehicle.

4.

He noted that both vehicles appeared to have occupants. The pickup truck was

running and he thought the Nissan vehicle was probably running.
5.

The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle

impossible. Castlebeny at 16 (15-20).
6.

Afifteen-year-oldgirl was in the driver's seat of the vehicle while defendant was

sitting in the rear seat with another passenger who had difficulty in understanding or
communicating in English. Castlebeny at 17 (1-15).
7.

Because it was past curfew, and a juvenile was present who was not licensed to

drive the vehicle, Deputy Castlebeny sought identification from defendant who claimed to be the
owner of the vehicle. Castlebeny at 17 (20).
8.

Deputy Castlebeny testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the

curfew violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's
time to be headed for home." But during the conversation he then learned that all the occupants
were from San Pete County. He wanted further to check to see if anyone was licensed to drive
the vehicle. Castlebeny at 37 (16-18).
9.

After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castlebeny then

opened the rear door on the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with defendant because he was
unable to see her through the window or from his vantage at the driver's open window.
10.

Officer Castlebeny asked defendant for identification. Defendant indicated or

pointed to a purse in the front passenger seat. Officer Castlebeny testified that he decided to
retrieve the license because it was located in a dark area over which he had no control.
Castlebeny at 17 (6-7).
11.

Officer Castlebeny, for safety reasons, then retrieved the purse himself "I

opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I believed to be her purse... As I reached for the
purse, I noticed a small white bindle containing a white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the
purse on the front seat." The bindle was in plain view on the passenger seat between the purse

and the console. The purse on the front seat did not belong to the defendant. While her driver's
license was ultimately obtained, it was not obtained from the purse on the front seat. Castleberry
at 18 (18-22).
12.

Defendant's purse, containing her license, was located later by Officer Castleberry

in thefrontpassenger area of the vehicle. He could not recall whether it was in the glove
compartment or thefloorarea, but was not on the front seat.
13.

Subsequent to entering the vehicle,findingthe evidence, and seizing the drugs,

Deputy Castleberry spoke with defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found. That questioning
was conducted without giving defendant her Miranda warnings. Castleberry at 42 (9-11).
14.

Deputy Castleberry questioned defendant after finding the illegal drugs. He

further testified that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs; (2) that person
would be defendant if no one else claimed the drugs; and (3) that defendant was not free to leave
during questioning. Castleberry at 41 (11-25) - 42 (1-8).
15.

Specifically, during the questioning of defendant, Miss Brake asked the deputy

what was going to happen. Deputy Castleberry told her, "I said, if I cannot determine who owns
the cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for
what is inside your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came forth
and claimed possession of it." Castleberry at 20 (21-25) - 21 (1-5).
16.

Officer Castleberry had called for backup and Officer Chipman arrived. He

conducted a further search of the Nissan as Officer Castleberry continued his investigation and
questioning of the occupants of both vehicles.
17.

Officer Chipman located, in plain view, a tin canister that had a straw in it and a

razor blade. These items were located "up against the back window" of the Nissan near where
the defendant was sitting.
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ISSUES
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence in this case because the search of the subject
vehicle was conducted without a warrant and because statements by the defendant to Officer
Castleberry were made without a Miranda warning.
ISSUE NO. 1
Was Sgt Castleberry's warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, which took
place when the officer opened the front passenger door of the defendant's vehicle,
permissible and justified?
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exception
to the warrant requirement to substantiate a search. State v Arrov. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
State v Shoulderblade. 905 P. 2d 289 (Utah, 1995). The State of Utah relies upon a Washington
Court of Appeals case, State v Grinien 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983), which stands for the
proposition that "if circumstances either place the police in danger or create a risk of loss or
destruction of evidence, a warrantless search is permissible." Id. at 552 (Emphasis added.) If this
is a paramount rule of law, one would certainly think there would be a case out of this
jurisdiction, and some case other than a Washington intermediate court of appeals to announce it.
This Court has carefully reviewed the testimony regarding Deputy Castleberry's
decision to retrieve defendant's driver's license as contained in direct examination (Transcript,
page 17, line 10-25; page 18, line 1 - 22) and cross examination (Transcript, page 33, lines 1425, and page 34, page 35, page 36, lines 1 - 25). Copies are attached.
Officer Castleberry testified that he intended to retrieve the purse out of a sense of
personal safety and to inspect the purse/area for weapons. Did he have sufficient justification to
be concerned? These are the "officer safety" facts:
1.

Ke was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup.
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2.

It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in Utah

3.

The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer Castleberry

County.
described it as a "deserted road."
4.

There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each, (three occupants in

the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked contiguous.)
5.

This was an area of frequent criminal activity.

6.

His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact that all of

the windows were fogged up.
7.

The other vehicle was running and Officer Castleberry testified he believed the

subject vehicle had the engine on with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl behind the wheel and two
other passengers in the back seat.
Ultimately would it have been permissible for Officer Castleberry to shine a flashlight
through the passenger window for safety purposes? Yes. Then, since the window was fogged
and severely restricted his vision, was he then justified to open the door? It is the opinion of the
Court that under these circumstances the Officer was justified in opening the passenger door.
When he did so the bindle of drugs was in plain view. Inevitably the drugs may have been
discovered even if the defendant had retrieved the purse because the purse did not belong to her
and presumably did not contain her license.
The Mirquet ruling clarified factors to be considered by a Court in assessing whether a
defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda.
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes is well settled. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree associated with formal arrest. More specifically, Miranda warnings are
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they
exert upon the detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
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exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned
of his constitutional rights.
The "not free to leave** standard, on the other hand, determines whether
a person has been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. That standard is broader than the Miranda standard. A person
may be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for
Fifth Amendment purposes. Whether one is "in custody" for Miranda
purposes depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation father
than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the
examination.
In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers,
even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to
leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. That is true even though an
officer engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during
the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a subjective,
unstated intent to arrest the driver. , .
To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest, Salt Lake City v Camen 664 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1983), set o"ut four factors to be evaluated: 1) the site of the
interrogation; 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of the
interrogation"...
In holding that Mirquet was in custody, the Court of Appeals, applying
the Carner factors, found that 1) the site of the interrogation was inside the
police car; 2) Officer Mangelson's investigation focused solely on defendant;
3) the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4) the form of the interrogation
evidenced a clear coercive intent on the part of the officer to prompt Mirquet
to produce incriminating contraband; and 5) the place of the interrogation
added to the coercive environment.
The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate
conclusion that the defendant was "in custody." Id at 1146, 47 & 48.
(Emphasis added).
ISSUE NO. 2
At what point was the defendant in custody and the subject of an interrogation so
to require the officer to administer Miranda warnings to the defendant?
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Both sides rely upon the case of State v. NCrquet 914 P_2d 1149 (Utah 1996). This
Court must apply the law contained in Mirquet to the facts of this case. The scenario of facts
presented by the State of Utah in its briefing seems to rely upon the officer's report, which is not
in evidence. The Court must rely upon the testimony at the hearing.
Likewise, the defendant relies upon "facts" that are not in evidence, such as "the
defendant was not experienced or knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure and the defendant
had never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal record." These facts are not in
evidence. Defense argues that Ms. Brake's "inexperience with the criminal justice system"
together with other circumstances mandate that the Miranda warning should have been prior to
interrogation.
Defendant further argues that a reasonable person in Miss Brake's shoes (knowledge,
experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject of a custodial
interrogation by Deputy Castlebeny. While that might be a correct statement of the law, there is
absolutely no testimony or evidence in the case respecting Ms. Brake's knowledge, experience
and understanding or her "inexperience with the criminal justice system." She did not testify at
the hearing and certainly there is no evidence that Deputy Castlebeny knew about or inquired
about her past criminal history, past drug use or her knowledge of the criminal justice system or
legal procedure. That would not have been permissible.
In the case at bar; Officer Castlebeny observed a white plastic bindle on the passenger
side front seat immediately after he opened the front door. He picked it up and asked who owned
it, to which no one responded. The bindle was next to a purse. When the officer asked who
owned the purse, the defendant, Ms. Brake or others, responded that the purse belonged to a
young woman in the second vehicle, the white truck. While Castlebeny was speaking with this
young woman, a backup officer, Deputy Chipman, arrived and Castlebeny directed him to search
the defendant's vehicle. As Officer Chipman was searching the defendant's vehicle, Castlebeny
spoke with several individuals including the defendant, Ms. Brake. He checked for signs of
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cocaine use in various individuals and testified: "It appeared to me that all of the individuals that I
looked at exhibited signs of having used cocaine."
No one was "free to leave" while the officer asked questions. Applying the
Mirquet/Carner test the Court finds:
1..

The questioning took place at the remote site in Officer Castleberry's patrol

2.

The investigation focused on all of the individuals in the two vehicles;

3.

There was no objective indicia of arrest; no handcuffing, no one being constrained

vehicle;

in a vehicle; no formal "you are under arrest" directive. In addition, there was nothing said which
attempted to coerce her or prompt her to retrieve incriminating evidence.
4.

The investigation was quite short and there was no coercive or accusatory

statements.
Accordingly, applying the four-pronged test, the Court does not find that Ms. Brake had
been "deprived of her freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda warnings. But
once she had admitted "the specific bindle was hers in addition to any cocaine that - the residue
that was found within the box..." the Miranda was implicated. It was not given at that stage and
should have been.
RULING
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. Counsel for the
State of Utah is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to calendar this case in order to set a jury trial.
Dated this /'

day of October, 2000.
"COURT
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